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Petr contends that the DC Superior Court lacked jurisdiction 
\-
~ 
to try his prosecution for a felony under the DC code. PetrJ~rguement 
starts with the fact that the judges of that court by statute have 
ii~ limited tenure and not protection against reductions in salary, 
and that the t~a Superior Court is a iaf legislative court established 
under Article I of the constitution. The key contention , however, is 
that only a court established under Article III can be given jurisdic-
tion to try a felony prosecution under an act of Congress which per-
• 
tains HE exclusively to tne DC. 
(Justice Rms Powell: I have included the relevant constitutional 
provismons for your reference on the last page.). 
This contention is without merit. In a variety of instances -Congress has ~i held that legislative courts may be vested with ~HBiEi 
judicial power, Williams v. United States, 289 u.s. 553. For exampl,, 
', 
state courts lacking Article III protections of un,limited tenure 
frequently BBix decide the federal rights and obligations of lit~ 
igants-- subject always to lila with ilsui li?IS rr:rrts to review up hereo 
The real issue in this case is whether the DC §up. Ct. was 
properly within the Article I powers of Congress to "exercise exclus--
ive Legislation in all cases whatsoever in the Dist. of Col." and 
to "make all laws which a~ s~ a~ shall be necessary and proper to 
carry into execution the foregoing powers." This isss~ax issue has 
been decided against petr in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tieewater 
Transfer Co.337 U.S.582 where the Court said that Congress may 
confer judicial power upon the courts of the District of Col. in 
the exercise of its Article I powers over the Districto As a 
practical matter, the Court of General Sessmons has historically 
exercised ~~ jurisdiction over a£~ acts made misdemeanors by act 
of ~-~i Congress. 
Petr's reliance on O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 US 516 is 
misleading for the Court never suggested in ~ that case tha~ongress 
lacked power to establish axsm~zt ~ an Article I court system for 
the District of Col. 
Axxax~zasti£ As I read Article I, the broad language of it 
confers on~ Congress total legislative authority over the District, 
should it EMBBB choose to use ito x Such sweeping authority cannot 
failt to include the power to establish a s~stem of courts. 
DE NY JHW 
P.s.--Petr brings up several search and seizure claims which appear 
without merit. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Art. I, § 8 provides, in pertinent part: 
The Congress shall have the Power * * * T~ 
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatso-
ever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles 
square) as may, by Cession of particular States, 
and the Acceptance of Congress, become th.~ ~e~t J 
of the Government of the United States
And 
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers * * *. 
Art. III provides, in pertinent part: 
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United 
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and 
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, 
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office. 
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to 
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority ;-to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls ;-to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; 
-to Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two 
or more States;-between a State and Citizens of 
another State ;-between Citizens of different 
States ;-between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
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April 4, 1973 JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In due course I will circulate an 
opinion in dissent from Byron's in 72~11, 
Palmore v. United States. 
The Conference 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Dougla~ 
Mr. Just~.ce Brennan 
Mr., Justl ce Stev;art 
Mr . JustJ ce J,~arshall 
Mr . Justice Dlackmun 
;;ii:Justice Powoll 
Mr . JuGtice Rehn•JUist 
From: White, J. 
1st DRAFT 
Circulated:___!d_- '-f -7 ~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 





No. 72- 11 
On Appeal from the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals. 
[April - , 1973] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Aside from an initial question of our appellate jurisdic-
tion under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), this case requires us 
to decide whe ther a defendant charged with a felony 
under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a 
judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure 
under Art. III of the Constitution. We hold that a de-
fendant charged with violating a local District of Co-
lumbia criminal law has no more federal constitutional 
r~~l the_ citizen~ State, when charged with 
violation of a state law, to be tried by a judge with life-..._____......__ ' - ., 
time te nure; and that under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, power 
t~ate for the District of Columbia, Congress may 
provide for such trials before judges who, in accordance 
with the District of Columbia Code are not provided with 
life tenure. 
I 
The facts are uncomplicated. In January 1971, two 
officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police 
Department observed a moving automobile with license 
tags suggesting that it was a rented vehicle. Although 
no traffic or other violation was then indicated, the of-
ficer stopped the vehicle for a spot-check of the driver's 
license and car-rental agreement. Palmore, the driver of 
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the vehicle, produced a rental agreement from the glove 
compartment of the car and explained why the car ap-
peared to be, but was not, overdue. During this time, 
one of the officers observed the hammer mechanism of a 
gun protruding from under the arnH"est in the front seat 
of the vehicle. Palmore was arrested and later charged 
with the felony of carrying an unregistered pistol in the 
District of Columbia after having been convicted of a 
felony, all in violation of the District of Columbia Code, 
~ 22-3204 (1967).1 He was tried and found guilty in 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. 
Under Title I of the District of Columbia Court Re-
form and Criminal Procedure Act of 1070, 84 Stat. 473 
et seq. (Reorganization Act),~ the judges of the superior 
1 The section proYided: 
"No por,;on shall within tho District of Cohunbia r:Hr~· ci1iwr 
open!~· or comcalrcl on or about hi,; por~on, (•xecpt in hi.' dwelling 
hou~r or place of bu~inr~~ or on other Lu:d po.-~o~~ed h.1· him, a 
pi,;tol, \\'ithout a liccn~e therefor i~~nrcl a~ herein:tftrr Jlrovided, or 
any dead!~· or dangerou~ wenpon (·apablr of bring ~o concealed. 
Whoe1·er 1·iol:ttc,; this Rec1ion shall be puni.-<hccl ns pro1·ided in section 
22-3215, unles;:; the violation occurs after he h:ts hccn com·ictcd 
in the District of Col11mbia of a violation of this ~crtion or of a 
fdony, either in the Di"trict of Columbia or in another juri~dirtion, 
in which case he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more 
1 ktn ten years." 
~Before passage of the Di~tril't of Columbia Court Hrform and 
Criminal Procedme Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473 et seq. (Tieorg:tnization 
Act), the local court s~·;,;tom con~i~ted of one appellate court and 
three trial courts, two of which, the juvenile comt and the tax court, 
wrre courts of ~pecial jurisdiction. Thr third tri:tl colll't, tbr Di~-
1rict of Columbia Court of General se~sion~. WflH Oil(' of qnitr lim-
ited jmi~diction, its criminal juri,t!irtion consi~ting Rolely of that 
exercised ronrurrentl~' with the Fnitrcl Strtte" Di~t rict Court over 
mi.-<demonnors and pett~· offen~e~. D. C. Code§ 11-903 (1907). Thr 
court's civil jurisdiction was restricted to rnse~ wherr the nmount 
in rontro,·ers~r did not excrrcl $10,000, nncl it had jurisdiction over 
cnses involving title to rcnl proJWrt~- only \\·hen it was part. of a 
cli1·orce nction. !d., nt §§ 11-961 and 11-1141. The judgments of 
the appellate court, tho District of Columbia Court of Appeal~, 
72-11-0PINION 
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court arc appointed by the President and serve for terms 
of 13 years. D. C. Code, §§ 11-1501 (a), 11-1502.': 
Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment against him, 
were ~ubjC'ct to rC'1·irw h.1· thr Unitrd Stntrs Court of .\ppC'nl~ fo1· 
thr Distrirt of Columbia. ld., nt 11-:321. 
Thr {!nitre! 8t:1te~ Di~trirt Court for thr Distrirt had conrurrrnt 
jmi~diction "·ith thr Court of Grnrrnl Sr~.-;ion~ o1·rr mo~t of the 
criminal nnd civil mnltrrs h:lndkd b~· 1l1:lt court, id., nt §§ 11-521, 
11-.'522, :mel 11-52:~, nnd hncl exdu~iw .i mi~clict ion o1·rr frluny of-
frnses, r1·rn though committed in viola! ion of locally npplicnblr lnws, 
id., nt § 11-521. Thu~ til<' Di~t rirt Court "·n~ fillin~ 1 he roiC' of 
hoth a lorn! nne! frclrrnl court. 
8erking to improve thr prrfonnancr of thC' court .<~·strm, Con-
grr~s. in Title I of thr Hcorgnnizntion Art, im·estrd thr lorn! courts 
with .iuri~cliction rqui1·nlrnt to thnt rxrreisrcl by st[ltr court~. S. Hrp. 
~o. 91-405, sup1'a. [lt 2-3; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, su7n·a, nt 23-24. 
Thr thrrr formrr tri:1l courts "·ere combinrcl into t hr nr"· Suprrior 
Court of the Distriet of Columbia, D. C. Code§ 11-901. which wns 
w~trd with minor rxcrptions with rxrlusiYc .iurisclietion o\"Cr nll 
crimin[l] cnses, including fdonies. brou.ght under lnws :1pplie:1hle 
ex!·lu~ii'('!Y to thr District, id .. at § 11-923 (b). Its civil juri~diction 
rrnrhrd [111 civil nctions :1nd nn~· othrr m[lttC'r at lnw or in equit~·. 
hron.u:ht in the Di~trict of Columbin, C'Xcrpt thosC' in whirh e-xrlusi\'C 
.imi~dirtion wns vc~trcl in the United States District Court. lrl.. [lt 
~ 11-921. The lorn! np])(':l]s ronrt. the Dist riet of Columhin Comt 
of Appr[l]s. would ultim[ltclv not be sub.iert to re1·iew b~· ihr 
lnited Rtntrs Comt of Ap]1e[l]s, id .. nt § 11-301. and was derbrrd to 
hr thr "highe~t court of the District of Columbia" for purpn:::rs of 
further rrview bv this Court. !d .. [lt § 11-102. 
Tn :1dclition to thr shift in juri~dirtion, thr numbrr of !oral judges 
"·a~ inrrrn~ed, their trnure wns lengthened from 10 to 15 ~·e[lr~. :1nd 
t hrir f'[l\nriC's were incrensrd and fixrd [lt a pC'rrent[lge of tk1t of 
.iudgrs of the Unitrd States courts. !d., nt §§ 11-703. 11-003, 
11-904, [llld 11-1502. The Reorgnnization Act C'f'tnhliRhed a Com-
mi-<sion on Judici[l] Dis:1bilities [lllcl TC'nnre to den] with ~<uspen~ion, 
ret irrmrnt. or removnl of loc:1l jndgrs, id., at § 1521, et seq. It 
nl~o pr01·iclrd for improwd [lclministration of thr lor:1l courtR, irl., 
nt § 11-1701, et seq .. inrlnding [luthorization for nn ExPcutive 
Offirrr rri'ponsiblc for the ndministration of the local comt s~·stem. 
ld .. nt § 11-1703. 
~The 15-~·mr term is subject to the ]1rovi8ion for m[lm\[ltor.\' rrtirr-
mrnt [lt [lge 70. D. C. Code § 11-1502. 
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urging that only a judge S('rving "during good behavior" 
as specified by Art. III of th(' United States Constitution 
could constitutionally preside over a felony proE:ecution 
under the District of Columbia Code. He also moved to 
suppress the pistol as the fruit of an illegal search and 
seizure. The motions were denied in the superior court 
and Palmore was convicted. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
affirmed, concluding that under the plenary power to leg-
islate for the District of Columbia conferred by Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, Congress had "constitu-
tional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only 
in the District and to select the appropriate court, 
whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I, 
to hear and determine these particular criminal cases 
within the District." 290 A. 2d 573, 576- 577 (1972). 
Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Ap-
peals and his jurisdictional statement here, purporting 
to perfect an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). We 
postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to re-
view this case by way of appeal to the hearing on the 
merits. 409 U. S. 840 (1972). 
II 
28 U. S. C. § 1257" specifies the circumstances under 
which the final judgments of the highest court of a 
State may be reviewed in this Court by way of appeal or 
4 28 U. S. C. § 1257 provides: 
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highrst court of 
a State in which a deci ion could be had, may be reYir\Ycd by the 
Supreme Court as follows: 
'· (1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a 
trraty or statute of the United States and the decision is again~t its 
validity. 
"(2) By appeal, where ir:; drawn in qurr:;tion the valiclily of a 
;.:tatute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the 
72-11-0PINION 
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writ of certiorari. As amended in 1970 by§ 172 (a)(1) 
of the Reorganization Act. 84 Stat. 590, the term "high-
est court of a State" as used in § 1257 includes the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals. Appeal lies only 
'vhere a statute of the United States is stricken down, 
28 U. S. C. § 1257 ( 1), or where a statute of a State is 
sustained against federal constitutional attack, id., at 
§ 1257 (2). Because the statute at issue was upheld in 
this case, an appeal to this Court from that judgment 
lies only if the statute 'vas a "statute of any State" 
within the meaning of § 1257 (2). Palmore insists that 
it is, but we cannot agree. 
The 1970 amendent to § 1257 plainly provided that 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should be· 
treated as the "highest court of a State," but nowhere 
in § 1257, or elsevvhere, has Congress provided that the 
words "statute of any State," as used in § 1257 (2), are 
to include the provisions of the District of Columbia 
Code. A reference to "state statutes" would ordinarily 
not include provisions of the District of Columbia Code, 
which was not enacted by a state legislature but by Con-
gress, and which applies only within the boundaries of 
the District of Columb.ia. The District of Columbia is 
constitutionally distinct from the States, Hepburn v. 
Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (1805), cf. Mutual Insurance Co. 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the deci~ion 
is in favor of its validity. 
"(3) By writ of certiorai, where the validity of a treaty or statute 
of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of 
a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being 
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, 
or where any title, right, priYilege or immunity is ~pecinlly t:et up 
or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or com-
mi~~ion held or authority exercised under, the United State8. 
"For the purposes of this t:ection, the term 'highest court of a 
State' includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals." 
72-11-0PINION 
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v. Tidewater Co., 337 U. S. 582 (1949). Nor does it 
follow from the decision to treat the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals as a state court that the District Code 
was to be considered a state statute for the purposes of 
§ 1257. We are entitled to assume that in ainending 
§ 1257, Congress legislated with care and that had Con-
gress intended to equate the District Code and state 
statutes for the purposes of § 1257, it would have said 
so expressly and not left the matter to mere implication." 
Jurisdictional statutes are to be construed "with pre-
cision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress 
has expressed its wishes," Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 392 U. S. 206. 212 
(19G8), and we are particularly prone to accord "strict 
construction of statutes authorizing appeals" to this 
Court. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, n. 1, 
at 42 (1970). We •vill not, therefore, hold that Con-
gress intended to treat the District of Columbia Code as 
a state statute for the purposes of § 1257 (2). 
Palmore relies on Balzac "i'. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298 
( 1922), where an enactment of the territorial legislature 
of Puerto Rico \Vas held to be a statute of a State within 
the meaning of the then applicable statutory provisions 
,; An exprro.-; proYi~ion would hnYc heen n simple thing. a.-; demon-
~~ r.1ted by specific provisions in i he United State~ Cod<' runcrrning 
ilw Di . ;;trict of Columbia. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1:~0:~, nddecl to thr 
United Sbte::; Code by § 172 (a) (2) (A) of the Jloorganizaiion Act, 
84 Stai. 590, IYhrro for purposes of r. 85 drnling with the juri~dic­
tion of the Unitrd Stairs Di~trirt Comt~, il i~ proYiclrd thnt 
"references to b1Ys of the United Stntr::; or Ario of Con,gre . .;s do not 
include law::; npplirnblr oxdusivrl ~· to thr Di~trict of Coluntbin." 
See also the irentmrnt of thr Di~trirt ol' Columbia :1~ a '·Stnte" for 
Jlltrpo~o~ of di1·or"it~· jmisdiction, 2S U. S. C. § 1::\:32 (d). nnd the 
rquall~· discrete JH'ol·i~ion of 28 U. S. C. § 1451. aclded to thr Coclr 
by § 172 (d) (1) of tho Reorgnlli7,Cttion Art, 84 Stat. 591, which 
providrs t hnt for purpo~es of the removal provi~ion~ t be Suprrior 
Court of the Di~trict of Columbia is io be ron~idrred n "St~ltr court" 
:1nd the Di~trict of Columbia deemed to be :1 "StatP." 
72-11-0PINION 
PALMORE v. UNITED STATES 7 
governing appeals to this Court. That result has been 
codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1258; but even so, the Balzac 
rationale was severely undermined in Fornaris where '"e 
hold that a statute passed by the legislature of Puerto 
Riro is not "a state statuto" within the meaning of 28 
U. S. C. § 1254 (2), and that it should not be treated as 
such in the absence of more definitive guidance from 
Congress. 
We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction of the 
appeal filed in this case. Palmore presents federal con-
stitutional issues, however, that are reviewable by writ 
of certiorari under § 1257 (3); and treating tho jurisdic-
tional statement as a petition for 'nit of certiorari, ~ e..f. 
y rcquiFecl by 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition 
limited to the question of whether Palmore was entitled 
to be tried by a court ordained and established in ac-
cm·dance with Art. III, § 1, of tho Constitution.'' It is 
to this issue that we now turn. 
III 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of tho Constitution provides that 
Congress shall have power "to exercise exclusive Legis-
lation in all Cases whatsoever" over the District of 
Columbia. The power is plenary. Not only may stat-
utes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be 
applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may 
also exorcise all the police and regulatory powers which 
a state legislature or municipal government would havO' 
"I3rcau:-<e we postponed the que~tion of om juri~dirtion o1·rr t hi~ 
[lppral to con~ideration of the merits, rather than enterin~ an unrr-
Htrictrd notation of probable jurisdiction, there is no b~t><i>< for 
infrrrin~. from our findin~ thi" appeal impro]1N, that our initial 
ordrr mu~t Ilel·erthele~., be taken ns havin~ grantrd rrrtiorari. 
Hrmr, om denbl of the writ with rrspcrl to the Fourth Amend-
mrnl rbim, rat her than a di~missaJ a~ improYidently grant rd. CL 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512-513 (1966). 
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in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress "may 
exercise within the District all legislative powers that 
the legislature of a state might exercise within the state; 
and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and 
among courts and magistrates and regulate judicial pro-
ceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it 
does not contravene any provision of the Constitution 
of the United States." Capital Traction Co. v. H of, 174 
U. S. 1, 5 ( 1899). This has been the characteristic view 
in this Court of congressional powers with respect to the 
District. 7 It is apparent that the power of Congress 
under Clause 17 permits it to legislate for the District 
in a manner with respect to subjects that ·would exceed 
its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the con-
text of national legislation enacted under other powers 
delegated to it under Art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. District 
of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 408 (1886). 
Pursuant to its Clause 17 authority, Congress has from 
time to time enacted laws that comprise the District of 
Columbia Code. The 1970 Reorganization Act amended 
the Code by creating the Superior Court for the District 
of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, the courts being expressly "established pursuant to 
article I of the Constitution." D. C. Code § 11-101 (2). 
See n. 2, supra. The Superior Court, among other things, 
was vested with jurisdiction to hear criminal cases in-
volving alleged violations of the criminal laws applicable 
only to the District of Columbia, id., at § 11- 923, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals with jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals in such cases. !d., at § 11-821. At 
the same time, Congress exercised its powers under Art. 
7 K endall v. United States, 12 Peters 524, 619 (1838); Matti ngly 
v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 690 (1878); Gibbons v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 407 (1886); Shoemaker v. United 
States, 147 U. S. 282, 300 (1897); Atlanta Cleaners & Dyers v. 
United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); O'Donoghue Y. United 
States, 289 U. S. 516, 518 (1933). 
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I, § 8. cl. 9. and Art. III to redefine the jurisdiction of 
the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. §~ 11-301, 11-501, and 
11-502. As the report of the Committee on The Dis-
trict of Columbia said, H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 44: 
"This title makes clear ( § 11- 101) that the District 
of Columbia courts (the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals and the Superior Court of the District 
of Columbia) are Article I courts, created pursuant 
to Art. I, section 8, clause 17, of the United States 
Constitution, and not Article III courts. The au-
thority under which the local courts are established 
has not been statutorily provided in prior law; the 
Supreme Court of the United States has not declared 
the local system to be either Article I or Article III 
courts, decisions having indicated that the District 
of Columbia courts arc, in this respect, both fish and 
fmd. This expression of the intent of Congress 
clarifies the status of the local courts." 
It was under the judicial power conferred on the Su-
perior Court by the 1970 Act that Palmore was convicted 
for violation of § 22-3204 of the District of Columbia 
Code. The conviction ':vas clearly within the authority 
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, unless, as Palmore 
contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prose-
cutions for District of Columbia felonies must be presided 
over by a judge having the tenure and salary protections 
provided by Art. III.8 Palmore's argument is straight-
8 Sections 1 and 2 of Art. III state: 
"SEC'l'ION 1. The judicial Power of the United States, ~:;hall be 
ye~t<·d in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Court~:; as the 
Con~res:; may from time to time ordain and establi~h. The .Judge~, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their oi!iec:; 
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
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forward: Art. Ill vests the "judicial Power" of the United 
States in courts with judges holding office during good 
behavior and whose salary cannot be diminished; the 
"judicial Power" that these courts are to exercise "shall 
extend to all Cases, in La\v and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution. the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made. or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority .... "; the District of Columbia Code, having 
been enacted by Congress, is a law of the United States; 
this prosecution for violation of ~ 22-3204 of the Code 
is therefore a case arising under the laws of the United 
States, involves an exercise of the "judicial Power" of 
the United States and must therefore be tried by an Art. 
III judge. 
This position ultimately rests on the proposition that 
an Art. III judge must preside over every proceeding in 
Srrvices n Compen~at ion which ~hall not be climini~hed during i hrir 
Continuance in Office. 
"SECTTON 2. The judicial Power ~hall extend to all Ca~es , in Law 
nne! Equit:-·, nri~ing umler this Con~titution, the Laws of the United 
States, nnd Treaties mnde, or which shall be made, unclN i heir Au-
t horit:-· ;-to all C:1se~ nffecting Ambne~ndor~, othrr public l\finist ers 
:1nd Con~ul~;-to all Ca~es of admiralt:-· nne! maritime .Tmi~dic­
tion ;-to ControYer~irs to which the United Stntes ~hnll be a 
Part:-· :-i o Contro1·rr~ies betwern t 11·o or more St:1trs :-brtwern a 
Stair :mel Citizens of nnothrr State ;-between Citiz('J~~ of di!Terent 
Stnt rs ;-bet"·rrn Citizens of the s:unr State claiming Lnnds nndet· 
C:r:1nts of differrnt Statrc;, nne! between :1 State, or the Citizens 
tlwrrof, :1ncl foreign State~, Citizens or Subjrct,. 
"In all Cn~es affecting Ambn~~mlor~, other ]1ttblic l\Tinister~ nnd 
Consuls, and those in which a State Rhall be party, the supreme 
Court shall hn1·e originnl Jurisdiction. In nil the othrr CnRes before 
mentioned, the supreme Court sh:1ll h:1Ye nppellnte Jurisdiction, 
both ns to Law nncl Fnct , with surh Exceptions, nnd undrr surh 
Rrgnlations ns the Congres~ shall make. 
'·The trinl of all Crimes, except in Cnsrs of Impenchmrnt, shnll 
be by .Jury: and such Trial shall br hrlcl in the State whrre the ~nid 
Crimrs shall hnn' been committed: but when not commit trd within 
any State, the Trial shall be at surh Pbre or PlnC('S ns the Congrrss 
ma:-· by law haw directed." 
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which charge, claim or defense is based on an Act of 
Congress or a law made under its authority. At the 
very least, it asserts that criminal offenses under the laws 
passed by Congress may 110t be prosecuted except in 
courts established pursuant to Art. III. In our view, 
ho,,·evcr, there is no support for this view in either 
the coustitutional text or in constitutional history and 
practice. 
Article III describes the judicial power as extending 
to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the 
United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is 
vested "in such inferior courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish." The decision with 
respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of 
defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of 
Congress. That body was not constitutionally required 
to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide ca~::es 
\vithin the judicial power of the United States, including 
those criminal cases arising under the laws of the United 
States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, \Vas it 
required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it "·as 
authorized to bestow under Art. III. "The judicial pow-
ers of the United States ... is r except in enumerated in-
stances, applicable exclusively to this Court l dependent 
for its distribution and organization, and for the mode of 
its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who 
possesses the sole power of creating the tribunals [inferior 
to the Supreme Court l ... and of investing them with 
jurisdiction, either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and 
of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degree 
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the 
public good." Cary v. Curtis, 12 Pet. 757, 721-722 
(1838) .° Congress plainly understood this, for until 1875 
"Thi.< w:l~ the Yiew of thr Coml prior 1 o M ariin ". lhmta's 
Lessee, l Wheat. 304 (1816). Turner "· Ban/,; of North Amerira. 
-l Dall. 8 (1799); United Slates v. lludson and Goodu•in, 7 Cranrh 
32 (1812). And the contrary statcmmts in Jlunter's L!'SS('(! , Sll]!ra,. 
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Congress refrained from providing the lower federal 
courts with general federal question jurisdiction. Until 
that time, the state courts provided the only forurn for 
vindicating many important federal claims. Even then, 
with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum 
for the trial of federal cases not involving the required 
jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retajned 
concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly ·within 
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 
It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, there-
fore, that trial and decision of all federal questions were 
reserved for Art. III judges. Nor, more particularly, 
has the enforcernent of federal criminal law been deemed 
the exclusive province of federal Art. III courts. Very 
early in our history, Congress left the enforcement of 
selected federal criminal laws to state courts and to 
state court judges who did not enjoy the protections 
prescribed for federal judges in Art. III. See Warren, 
Federal Criminal Laws and State Courts, 38 IIarv. L. 
Rev., 545, 551-553, 570- 572 (1925); Frankfurter and 
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court, 293 (1928); 
note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal 
Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial 
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1947). More recently, 
this Court unanimously held that Congress could con-
stitutionally require state courts to hear and decide 
Emergency Price Control Act cases involvinig the en-
forcement of federal penal laws; " ... that Rhode Island 
has an established policy against enforcement by its 
courts of statutes of other States and the United States 
nt 327-339, did not sun ·ivc later cases. Sec for rxample, in addition 
lo Cleary v. Curtis, quoted in tho text, Rhode Island v. Massachu-
setts, 12 Pet. 657, 721-722 (1831\); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 
(1850); Case of the Sc"Wing Machine Companies, 18 WalL 55:3, 557-
578 (1874); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 233-234 
(1922). 
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which it deems penal cannot be accepted as a valid 
excm:e." Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 391 (1947). 
Although recognizing the contrary sentiments expressed 
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 615 ( 1842). and 
some other cases, the sense of the Testa opinion was 
that it merely reflected long-standing constitutional de-
cision and policy represented by such cases as Claflin v. 
Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1896), and Mondou v. New 
York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
It is also true that throughout our history, Congress 
has exercised its power under Art. IV "to make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States" by creating 
territorial courts and manning them with judges ap-
pointed for a term of years. These courts have not been 
deemed subject to the strictures of Art. III, even though 
they characteristically enforced not only the civil and 
criminal laws of Congress applicable throughout the 
United States, but also the laws applicable only within 
the boundaries of the particular territory. Speaking for 
a unanimous Court in American and Ocean Ins. Co. v. 
356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 546 (1828), Chief Jus-
tice Marshall held that the territorial courts of Florida, 
although not Art. III courts, could hear and deter-
mine cases governed by the admiralty and maritime 
law that ordinarily could be heard only by Art. III 
judges. " ... [T]he same limitation does not extend 
to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exer-
cises the combined powers of the general and of a state 
government." Id., at 546. This has been the cou-
sistent view of this Court.10 Territorial courts, therefore, 
1° Clinton Y. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle 
'. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 655 (1874); Reyuolds Y. United States, 
98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 154 (1878); The "City of Panama," 101 U.S. 
45:), 460 (1880); !IIcAllister v. Unit('(/ Stales, 1-l-1 U. A. 174, 180-
184 (1890); United States v. McMillan, 165 U. S. 504, 510 (1897); 
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have regularly tried criminal cases arising under the 
gcnerallaws of Congress," as well as those brought under 
territorial laws.'e 
There is another context in which criminal cases aris-
ing under federal statute are tried and defendants con-
victed in non-Article III courts. Under its Art. I power 
"to make rules for the government and regulation of the 
land and naval forces," Congress has declared certain 
behavior by members of the Armed Forces to be criminal 
and provided for the trial of such cases by court-martial 
proceedings in the military mode, not by courts ordained 
and established under Art. III. Within their proper 
sphere, courts-martial are constitutional instruments to 
carry out congressional and executive will. Dynes v. 
Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 82 (1858). The "exigencies 
of military discipline require the existence of a special 
system of military courts in which not all of the special 
procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III trials 
need apply. O'Callaha11 v. Parker, 395 U. S. 256, 261 
(1969); 'Path v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). And 
"the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those 
performing judicial functions in military trials." 
"The same confluence of practical considerations that 
dictated the result in [American and Ocean Ins. Co. v. 
356 Bales of Cotton, supra], has governed the decision 
in latter cases sanctioning the creation of other courts 
Roneu "· Todd. :20fi U. 8. 35S, :3GO (1907): Glidden "· Zadnok, 
:370 U. S. 530, 5+4-5-+8 (19fi2). 
"Srr, e. g., Baker "· Uuited Slates, 1 \Vi~. 641 (1846); United 
States \'. Tom, 1 Orr. 21\ (1858): Franklin , .. United Statrs. 1 Colo. 
35 (18fi7): Pickett "· ['Jiited States. 1 Idaho 52:3 (187-l,): CnitC'd 
Sta.trs , .. Rey11old~. 1 nah 22fi (1875): Fishrr v. r'nitrd States, 
1 Okla. 252 ( 1.'192). 
1 ~ 8C'C', e. g., Trrritor!J of Orr(/011 1' . Colc111rm. 1 OrC'. 191 (1S55); 
Gile "· Peo]JIC'. 1 Colo. GO (181\7); Peo]Jlc , .. lratcrs. 1 Tdnho 51\0 
(1874); People 1'. Shafer, 1 Ut:1h 2fi0 (1875); Ex parte Larkin. 1 
Okla. 53 (1891). 
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·with judges of limited tenure," Glidden v. Zadnok, 370 
U. 8. 530, 547 (1962), such as the Court of Private Land 
Claims, United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 85-86 (1894); 
The Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, Stephens 
v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445 (1899); Ex parte 
Joinves, 191 U. S. 93 (1893); Wallace v. Adams, 204 
U. S. 415 (1907); courts created in unincorporated dis-
tricts outside the mainland, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 
244, 266- 267 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 
312-313 ( 1922), and the Consular Courts established by 
concessions from foreign countries, In re Ross, 140 U. S. 
45::3. 464- 465, 480 (1891). 
IV 
·whatever may be true in other instances, however, it 
is strongly argued that O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 
U. S. 516 (1933), constrains us to hold that all of the 
courts of the District of Columbia must be deemed 
Art. III courts and that the judges presiding over them 
must be appointed during their good behavior in accord-
ance " ·ith the requirements of Art. III. O'Donoghue 
involved the question whether the juclges of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals of the District of Co-
lumbia were constitutionally protected from having their 
salaries reduced by an Act of Congress. This Court, over 
three dissents and contrary to extensive prior dicta. see 
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438. 450 (1829); 
Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50 ( 1884); Keller v. 
Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Radio 
Comm?·ssion v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930) , 
held that the two District of Columbia courts under con-
sideration were constitutional courts exercising the judi-
cial power of the United States and that the judges in 
question were not subject to the salary reduction legisla-
tion as they would have been had they been judges of 
legislative courts. 
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We cannot agree that O'Donoghue governs this caEe.13 
The District of Colun1bia courts there involved. the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, had authority 
only in the District, but also over all those controversies, 
civil and criminal, arising under the Constitution and the 
statutes of the United States and having nationwide 
application. TheEe courts, as this Court noted in its 
opinion were "of equal rank and po·wer with thoPe of 
other inferior courts of the federal system . . . .'1 
O'Donoghue, supra, at 534. Relying heavily on con-
gressional intent, the Court considered that Congrei's, 
by consistently providing the judges of these courts 
with lifetime tenure, had indicated a "congreEsional prac-
tice from the beginning r which] recognized a complete 
parallelism between the courts of the District r of Co-
lumbia l and the district and circuit courts of appeals of 
the United States." !d., at 549. Moreover, these courts. 
constituted as they were, and being closer to the legisla-
tive department, "exercise a more extensive jurisdiction 
in cases affecting the operations of the general govern-
13 Wr ~hould note herr that in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U. 8. 
530 (1962), it was urged that Art. III forbadr the ns~ignnwnt of a 
judge of a Court of Customs and Patent Appr!1ls to tr~' a rrimiual 
ra~e Rrisina: 1mder the Distrirt of Columbia Codr. The Court of 
Appeal~ ruled that rvrn if the judge in qnr~tion wnH nol nn Art. III 
judge. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, was sufficirnt authorit~· for !JiR a8-
~ignrnent to try cases in tlw District. The United Statrs hrrr 
urged that this was true at lrast with rrspect to hws ari-.ing under 
the Di~trirt of Columbin Code rather than under n law of n:1tional 
npplirntion. l\1r. .Justice Ilnrl:m, for himself, nnd .Justice~ BRENNAN 
nnd STEWART, found it unnerrssnry to reach this question but con-
~idered it an open one, for he expressly reserved "intimating [an~r] 
view as to the correctness of thr holding below .... " !d., nt 538. 
Apparently, for him, O'Donoghue had not foreclosrd the i~snr with 
resprct to the trinl of the criminal case under the DiRtri<'t. of Colum-
bia Code. Mr. Ju~lice Clark, for himself and the Chief .Justirc, 
al~o thou~ht thr qurstion open. Sre 070 U. S., at n. 4, at. 580. 
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mcnt and of its various departments," id., at 535, and 
were the only courts within the District in which Dis-
trict inhabitants could exercise their "right to have their 
cases arising under the Constitution heard and deter-
mined by federal courts created under, and vested with 
the judicial power conferred by, Art. III." I d., at 540. 
The case before us is a far cry from O'Donoghue. Here 
Congress has expressly created two systems of courts in 
the District. One of them, made up of the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit are constitutional courts manned by Art. 
III judges to which the citizens of the District must or 
may resort for consideration of those conl"~.itutional and 
statutory matters of general concern which so moved 
the Court in O'Donoghue. The other system is made 
up of strictly local courts, the Superior Court and the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. These 
courts were expressly created pursuant to the plenary 
Art. I power to legislate for the District of Columbia, 
D. C. Code § 11-10 (2), and to exercise the "powers 
of ... a state government in all cases where legislation 
is possible." Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 
147 1889). 
The O'Donoghue Court had before it District of Co-
lumbia courts in which the consideration of "purely 
local affairs is obviously subordinate and incidental." 
O'Donoghue, supra, at 539. Here, on the other hand, 
we have courts the focus of whose work is primarily 
upon cases arising under the District of Columbia Code 
and to other matters of strictly local concern. They 
handle criminal cases only under statutes that arc ap-
plicable to the District of Columbia alone. O'Donoghue 
did not concern itself with courts like these, and it is not 
controlling here. 
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It is apparent that neither this Court nor Congress 
has read the Constitution as requiring every federal ques-
tion arising under the federal law, or even every criminal 
prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be 
tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime 
tenure and protection against salary reduction. Rather, 
both Congress and this Court have recognized that state 
courts are appropriate forums in which federal questions 
and federal crimes may at times be tried; and that the 
requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where 
laws of national applicability and affairs of national con-
cern arc at stake, must in proper circumstances give way 
to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to 
legislate with respect to specialized areas having par-
ticularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment. 
Here, Congress established one set of courts in the Dis-
trict with Art. III characteristics and devoted to matters 
of national concern. It also created a wholly separate 
court system designed primarily to concern itself with 
local law and to serve as a local court system for a large 
metropolitan area. 
From its own studies, Congress had concluded that 
there was a crisis in the .i udicial system of the District 
of Columbia, that case loads had beccome unmanageable, 
and that neither those matters of national concern nor 
those of strictly local cognizance were being promptly 
tried and disposed of by the existing court system.''' The 
1
' The Scnntr Committrr notrd th:lt though n~ man~· ns 12 out 
of the 14 District Comt juclgr~ had brrn n~~ignrd full timr 1o the 
tri:tl of thr lorn! fdon)· offrn~r~, 1lw bbrklog of criminal r:1~C's in 
the Frdeml Dist ri rt Court numbrrwl 1,669 and tlw mcclinn time 
lapFc from filing to final dispo~ition in felon~· tri:-ds in that ronrl 
was morr than triple that in othN cli~trirt courts. Thr mc·di:m time 
for ri\·il jury trinl in the District Court for the Di~t ri r·t of Columbia 
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remedy, in part, was to relieve the regular Art. III courts, 
that is, the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, from the smother-
ing responsibility for the great mass of litigation, civil 
and criminal, that inevitably characterizes the court sys-
tem in a major city and to confine the work of those 
courts to that which, for the most part, they were de-
signed to do, namely, the trial of cases arising under 
the Constitution and the generally applicable laws of 
Congress. The other part of the remedy, equally essen-
tial, was to establish an entirely new court system with 
functions essentially similar to those of the local courts 
found in the 50 States of the Union with responsibility 
for trying and deciding those distinctive local contro-
versies that arise under local law, including local criminal 
laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local juris-
diction. S. Rep. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Scss., 2-3, 
5, 18; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 23-24. 
Furthermore. Congress. after careful consideration, de-
termined that it preferred. and had the pmYer to utilize, 
a local court system staffed by judges without lifetime 
tenure. Congress made a deliberate choice to create 
judgeships with terms of 15 years, D. C. Code § 11-1502, 
and to subject judges in those positions to removal or 
suspension by a judicial commission under certain limited 
and defined circumstances. !d., at § 11-1521 et seq. It 
was thought that such a system would be more workable 
and efficient in administering and discharging the work 
of a multifaceted metropolitan court system. SeeS. Rep. 
No. 91-405, supra, at 8-11; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, 
at 35-39. 
wa~ nrarly double thnt in othn di~1riet court8. Though thrre had 
hrrn nn inrrr~1"e in 1 hr number of felonir" committed in thr Di. ·-
trirt of Columbin, 1 hrrr IY11S a eonromitnnt decrease in the number 
of fclouir:;; pro8rcuted. S. Rrp., supra. at 2-3. 
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In providing for terms of office, rather than for service 
during good behavior or lifetime tenure, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals noted that the Reorganiza-
tion Act 'vas consistent with the situation in 46 of the 50 
States, 290 A. 2d, at 578 n. 5, and the provisions of the 
Act, with respect to court administration and to judicial 
removal and suspension, v;·ere considered by some as a 
model for the States with large, metropolitan judicial 
systems. 
We do not discount the importance attached to the 
tenure and salary provisions of Art. III, but vve conclude 
that Congress was not required to provide an Art. III 
court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its 
laws applicable only within the District of Columbia. 
Palmore's trial i11' th-e Superior Court was authorized by 
Congress' Art. I power to legislate for the District in 
all cases whatsoever. Palmore was no more disadvan-
taged and no more entitled to an Art. III judge than 
any other citizen of any of the 50 States who is tried for 
a strictly local crime. Nor did his trial by a nontenured 
judge deprive him of due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment any more than the trial of the citizens of the 
various States for local crimes by judges without protec-
tion as to tenure deprive them of due process of law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
Larry Hammond 
No . 72-11 Palmore v . United States 
Justice White's opinion is in accord with my views. ·~ 
( .~. 
~ ~:~ ~ 
If you have a chance to look at this before I leave for 
·~ ' 
El Paso on Monday, let me know what you think. I do not 
want you, however, to interrupt your work on the opinions 
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Dear Byron, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 




-' CHAMBERS OF 
~rtmt (!fttttrt ttf tlrt ~ttift~ ~htttg 
~ngJrittghm. ~. <!f. 21l~'1;1 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
April 9, 1973 
Re: No. 72-11 - Palmore v. U.S. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
j.Ct ·t1 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
.. ·-·~· .. ..,.. 
·~ 
I 
C HAMBlRS 0,... 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H REHNQUIST 
.Jlt.J1ftmt "+ tturl ttf tlrt ~tb .Jtatt• 
.. ufrington. ~. <If. 2llp.Jt.~ 
Apri l 11 , 19 73 
Re: No. 72-11 - Palmore v. United States 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
. / 
CHAMBERS OF 
~uprttttt <!fou.rt cf tlrt ~ttittlt ~tafts 
1Dasftittgton. gl. <!f. 20,?'-1-;1 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 12 1 1973 
Re: No. 72-11 - Palmore v. U. S. 
Dear Byron: 










THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
.:§u.prtmt QfOltrl of t4t 'JnUe~ .:§tattg 
'J!UTag!p:ttght~ Jl. <If. 2l!p~~ 
April20, 1973 
Re: No. 72-11- Palmore v. U. S. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 


















































































































re v. v. s. 
